Raja Halwani

Praise for the First Edition

“ Raja Halwani tackles these important subjects with characteristic energy,

incisiveness, and wit. Even where you disagree with him, you learn from him.

This book deserves a wide audience. ”

— John Corvino, Wayne State University

“ Skillfully combines meticulous philosophical analysis of contemporary

romantic and sexual mores with vivid, earthy examples of the problems and

permutations of actually living them. ”

— Jane O’Grady, City University London, Times Higher Education

“ A provocative and immensely helpful introduction to this area . . . I recommend it. ”

— Christian Perring, Metapsychology Online Reviews

Praise for the Second Edition

“Halwani’s book is rigorously argued, admirably comprehensive, and unafraid

to explore the darker sides of love and sex. In this updated edition, he brings

his astute critical sense to bear on the last decade’s rich crop of new work on

sex, gender, polyamory, and marriage. The result is fi rst rate.”

—Ronald de Sousa, University of Toronto

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Book Details

Price	3.00
Pages	438 p
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ISBN	978-1-138-28014-4 (hbk) 978-1-138-28020-5 (pbk) 978-1-315-27239-9 (ebk)
Copyright©	2018 Taylor & Francis

About the Author

Raja Halwani is Professor of Philosophy at the School of the Art Institute of

Chicago. He is the lead editor of The Philosophy of Sex, Seventh Edition (2017),

a co-editor of Queer Philosophy (2012), co-author of The Israeli–Palestinian

Confl ict (2008), the editor of Sex and Ethics (2007), and the author of Virtuous Liaisons (2003).

Preface

The second edition of Philosophy of Love, Sex, and Marriage: An Introduction

is much improved from the fi rst. The style, for one thing, is less verbose

and more to the point. The part on love (Part I) now contains two chapters on

love and morality (as opposed to one in the fi rst edition), given the growing

literature on love as a moral emotion. The part on sex (Part II) contains fi ve

instead of four chapters, with a chapter devoted to the treatment of sex and

virtue ethics. In Part II, I also devote space at the end of each chapter to a specifi

c “applied” topic, such as pornography, BDSM, prostitution, racial sexual

desires, and adultery.

Part I, on love, has four chapters: the fi rst deals with issues surrounding

the nature of romantic love and the thorny issue of whether love is reasonresponsive.

I introduce a distinction between two forms of romantic love (what

I call RL1 and RL2) that play an important role throughout the discussion of

love, and I use the distinction to address the issue of whether love is reasonresponsive.

In the second chapter, I explain and evaluate those characteristics

of romantic love thought to be true of it, such as constancy, exclusivity, sexual

desire, union, and intimacy, with an eye as to whether they are indeed true of

it. I end the chapter by discussing what the object of love is and the bases on

which people love others. The third chapter deals with love and morality, specifi

cally, with how romantic love fares on the major moral theories, and what

moral restrictions there are on love. In the fourth chapter I discuss various

recent philosophical attempts to argue that romantic love is a moral emotion

(that it is inherently morally good) and fi nd them all defi cient. I end the chapter

by suggesting one way to think of romantic love as moral.

The fi rst chapter in Part II, on sex, is retained almost intact from the fi rst

edition; in it I discuss and evaluate attempts to defi ne central concepts such as

“sexual desire” and “sexual activity.” At the end of the chapter I use adultery,

prostitution, and casual sex as examples of sexual concepts that resist easy

defi nitions. Chapter 6 is about sexual pleasure and sex and morality, in which

I discuss sex and sexual pleasure in connection with the moral theory of consequentialism.

At the end of the chapter I use prostitution as an illustration of

applying consequentialist thinking to a particular sexual practice. Chapter 7

addresses sex and virtue ethics, another moral theory that has gained traction

in the last 30 years or so. I use the example of having or not having desires for

members of a racial or ethnic group to discuss whether such desires tell against

the virtue of the person who has them. Chapter 8 discusses sex and Kantian

ethics, with a focus on the concept of objectifi cation. I use pornography as a

type of sexual practice to illuminate further debates about sex and objectifi cation.

In the fi nal chapter on sex, I discuss sexual perversion and why attempts

to defi ne the concept have failed. I then turn to the ethics of fantasy and use the

desires of BDSM as an illustrative type of practice.

Part III, on marriage, consists of two chapters. The fi rst deals with what marriage

is, whether it has any essential characteristics, whether it has any shared

social meaning, and whether it should extend to include polyamorous groups.

The second chapter raises the question about the necessity of marriage given

that the state is a third party to it—given that marriage is a legal institution. I

removed a direct discussion of the arguments for same-sex marriage now that

same-sex marriage is the law of the land in the United States and now that it

has become either socially accepted or tolerated. I do refer to these arguments

every so often in service of the broader discussion of what marriage is.

With the exception of Chapter 5 , every chapter is signifi cantly different

from—and an improvement upon—its counterpart (if it has a counterpart)

in the fi rst edition. Some of the chapters retain some of the same paragraphs

from the fi rst edition, but they are integrated in the chapter differently and are

likely to have been edited to some extent. Some explanations of moral theories

appear both in Part I and Part II in case the reader decides to only read Part II or

to read it fi rst. I apologize for the repetition, but the explanations are also somewhat

different in that each stresses different points relevant to the discussion.

The field of the philosophy of sex and love is vast, containing many topics

and branching into related ones, such as the family, friendship, procreation,

commitments, faithfulness, and practical rationality. Sexual practices are also

numerous, and my use of certain examples (adultery, BDSM, pornography,

prostitution, for instance) only scratches the surface. Indeed, a comprehensive

treatment of the conceptual and moral aspects of many sexual practices, especially

the lesser-discussed ones (e.g., pedophilia, zoophilia, and necrophilia) is

long overdue—perhaps this will be a future project.

At the end of each chapter there is a section of “Further Reading,” containing

suggestions of additional essays and books on some of the topics discussed

in the chapter. These sections, revised from the fi rst edition, are meant

to include additional readings to the ones in the endnotes (only on occasion

do I repeat in the “Further Reading” sections the essays and books cited in

the endnotes). At the beginning of the bibliography, there is a list of anthologies,

to many of whose essays I refer in the book. These anthologies constitute

further additional (and crucial) readings for anyone interested in pursuing the

themes of this book. At the end of each chapter, there is also a list of study

questions (thoroughly revised from the fi rst edition) meant to encourage the

reader to think more about topics discussed in the chapter or merely touched

upon. Some of the questions embody implicit criticisms of what I have written

or point to gaps in my discussion, thereby enabling the reader to evaluate the points I make.

There are many reasons for the deep changes in the chapters, some owing to

a different style of writing, and some owing to the need to discuss new philosophical

views, but most owing to the change in my own views of these topics.

My views on the issues of this book have changed over the years. This is

due to the change in my own thinking about them, of course, which itself has

been partially shaped by the numerous discussions I have had about them with

colleagues and students who have impressed upon me how different from each

other sex, love, and marriage are (changing social attitudes seem to refl ect this

view), and how all three are morally problematic in many ways. My personal

observations of the numerous personal relationships around me have in their

own way confi rmed all this. Although I do not see romantic love as a bad thing,

I do see it as being in need of serious moral scrutiny and nowhere as good as

some other philosophers think. I continue to think that friendships and other

deeply caring relationships deserve the kind of cultural, social, and possibly,

in the guise of marriage, legal recognition that romantic love often receives.

I have no illusions anymore about the objectifying nature of sexual desire, no

matter how much philosophers try to make it seem benign. I have come to

realize that we cannot do without state regulation, to some extent or in some

ways, of some types of intimate relationships. Whether this means that marriage

should not be abolished is an open question, though for sure it is in need

of serious reform. The issue then is which relationships require the support of

the state and how this support should manifest itself.

I strove in this book to strike the proper balance between raising in a clear

and fair way the important themes of each topic while also clearly and plausibly

defending my own views on them. To be sure, I do not have views on

every issue I discuss in this book, but I do have views on some, and I hope that

in those cases I was able to defend them moderately well while also fairly and

clearly explaining the opposed views. It goes without saying that the literature

on all these issues is vast, and I hope that I have not neglected to treat an important work or view.

A note on the use of terminology: I use “lover” to refer to the agent or the

active party in a relationship and “beloved” to refer to the receiving party, the

object or the recipient of love. I do not use these terms to refer to a specifi c gender,

whether cis or trans. And I do not mean to imply that a beloved is not also

a lover or that a lover is also not a beloved. But using them in a unidirectional

way makes for a simpler discussion. I apologize to the readers for my use of the

pronouns “he” and “she” and not “they” (in the singular). No discrimination of

any sort is meant on my part, and the use is purely stylistic.

Almost 95% of this book was written at Peet’s coffee shop, at the corner of

Halsted and Cornelia in Chicago. I spent almost every weekday of the summer

of 2017 there, from morning to evening, writing and sucking down soy lattes. I

have come to know the baristas on a fi rst-name basis, and I want to thank them

all for their sunny natures, their cheerfulness, their helpfulness, and, every so

often, their rambunctiousness. So thank you, Amber, Becky, Corina, Hayes,

Jerrad, Maggie, Nick, Nicole, Nina, Sam, Shane, and Wes.

I wish to thank Andrew Beck at Routledge for encouraging me to write a

second edition of the book, and Vera Lochtefeld, also at Routledge, for her

support and assistance during the last stages of the book. I also wish to thank

all my friends and colleagues with whom I have discussed these topics over

the years. Thanks to Lisa Wainwright, the Dean of Faculty at the School of the

Art Institute of Chicago, for a research grant that helped me write this book.

Thanks to Elizabeth Brake and Shaun Miller for discussion of specifi c points

in the text. Thanks to Alan Soble for his care, wisdom, generosity, honesty, and

experience. He has been the teacher in my life. Thanks to Elliot Layda for discussing

many of these issues, especially love, with me over the years. Thanks

to all my other close friends, with whom I include my brothers, my cousins, my

nieces, and my one nephew: thank you for easing the burdens of life and even

making it enjoyable. And thanks to Helkin Rafael Gonzalez Tovar for loving

me (which includes putting up with me), and for showing me on a daily basis

what moral goodness looks like.

Table of Contents

Preface xi

Introduction 1

PART I

Love 7

1 What Is Romantic Love? 9

Outline of the Chapter 9

Preliminaries 9

What Is the Nature of Romantic Love? 10

RL1 and RL2 20

Is RL1 Infatuation? 23

Love and Reasons 26

Summary and Conclusion 43

Study Questions 43

Philosophy of Love, Sex, and Marriage: An Introduction, Second Edition

Raja Halwani

Praise for the First Edition

Praise for the Second Edition

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